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I. Introduction 
Major charitable organizations—which are referred to in this Note as 
“Big Philanthropy”—have a growing influence on the American public 
education landscape.  As one of their many selected social causes, Big 
Philanthropy invests large sums of money and wields its political influence 
to promote particular education reform initiatives selected by each 
foundation.  Many praise Big Philanthropy for its contributions and 
dedication to education; however, evidence is mounting that many of these 
reforms are not only failing, but are also having a detrimental impact on 
students, schools, and communities.
1
  While Big Philanthropy’s 
participation in education reform grows amidst this negative evidence, 
critics have begun to question Big Philanthropy’s intentions, arguing that its 
involvement is for the benefit of Big Philanthropy, rather than students.
2
  
In this Note, I lay the factual predicate for a legal response to the 
increasing involvement of Big Philanthropy in public education.  First, I 
will highlight the continuing struggle for adequate education funding and 
how Big Philanthropy became involved in this cause.
3
  Next, I will utilize 
two education reform initiatives that are heavily funded by Big 
Philanthropy to illustrate the negative impacts Big Philanthropy’s increased 
involvement has had on the American education landscape.
4
  Finally, I will 
briefly address some suggested legal responses to problems articulated in 
this Note.
5
   
Going back to the ideals articulated in Brown v. Board of Education,
6
 I 
begin my Note by laying the foundation for why public education funding 
                                                                                                     
 1. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 2. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 3. See infra Parts II–III. 
 4. See infra Part IV. 
 5. See infra Part V. 
 6. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding “that in the field of 
public education ‘separate but equal’ has no place,” and holding that segregation deprives 
African Americans equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
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is so critical and why adequate funding has been so difficult to attain.
7
  
Then, I will outline how courts handled public education funding after 
Brown by showing the different legal approaches litigants have utilized in 
their fight to ensure all public school students have access to an adequate 
education.
8
  To conclude this section, I will show how a national education 
report in the 1980s, A Nation at Risk, catapulted education into the national 
political spotlight, eventually leading to the federal government’s 
involvement in public education—a sphere traditionally reserved for state 
power.
9
  The federal legislation that arises from this evolution sets the stage 
for Big Philanthropy’s entrance into public education reform.
10
 
This Note next focuses on Big Philanthropy’s involvement with the 
American public education system.  After briefly chronicling Big 
Philanthropy’s original involvement in public educational pursuits, I 
explain how changes in public education have altered how Big Philanthropy 
contributes to public education; no longer just a supplier of money, it is 
now becoming a vehicle for education reform.
11
  This discussion leads to 
statistics of Big Philanthropy’s involvement today and the role it now 
occupies.
12
  I end this section touching on general criticisms of Big 
Philanthropy’s involvement in public education as some educators and 
philanthropists begin to question the effectiveness of educational 
experiments led by Big Philanthropy.
13
 
The Note then transitions to an analysis of two particular education 
reform initiatives that Big Philanthropy heavily funds and supports.  I first 
focus on the charter school movement, which has been a part of education 
reform for the past two decades.
14
  Beginning with a definition and brief 
history of charter schools, I reveal the contrast between the initial intentions 
of charter schools and their role in education today.
15
  After outlining a few 
key distinctions between traditional public schools and charter schools, I 
then illustrate how charter schools give Big Philanthropy a unique, 
                                                                                                     
the United States Constitution (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896))). 
 7. See infra Part II.A.  
 8. See infra Part II.B.  
 9. See infra Part II.C. 
 10. See infra Part II.C.  
 11. See infra Part III.B.  
 12. See infra Part III.C.  
 13. See infra Part III.D.  
 14. See infra Part IV.A.1.  
 15. See infra Part IV.A.1.  
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powerful position within public education.
16
  Lastly, I explain how the 




Second, I address a relatively new education reform initiative: parent 
trigger legislation.  Because parent trigger laws have only been in existence 
for about four years, I begin the analysis with a description of this 
legislation, what supporters believe these laws can accomplish, and an 
introduction to the limited evidence supporting the effectiveness of this 
legislation.
18
  Next, I focus on how Big Philanthropy is connected to parent 
trigger legislation through significant funding and its close connections to 
one of the major organizations promoting the movement.
19
  After laying 
this foundational framework, the Note then illustrates the negative effects 
of parent trigger legislation.
20
  
I conclude my Note by briefly addressing some suggestions that have 
been made to combat the negative effects arising out of not only the 
initiatives Big Philanthropy promotes, but also the involvement of third 
parties in public education in general.
21
  The two main recommendations 
for change considered are increased regulation of charter schools and 
greater transparency in both charter schools and parent trigger legislation.
22
  
I touch on the prescriptions for change rather briefly because, with the 
exception of a few scholars and journalists, Big Philanthropy’s negative 
effects on education have received little attention.
23
  Therefore, this Note 
demonstrates that not only is a legal response appropriate, but there is also a 
need for increased research on these emerging problems and how legal 
remedies can address them. 
                                                                                                     
 16. See infra Part IV.A.2–3.  
 17. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
 18. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 19. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 20. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 21. See infra Part V. 
 22. See infra Part V. 
 23. See Joanne Barkan, Got Dough? How Billionaires Rule Our Schools, DISSENT 
(Winter 2011) [hereinafter Billionaires], available at http://www.dissentmagazine. 
org/article/got-dough-how-billionaires-rule-our-schools (noting that while reporters cover 
Big Philanthropy’s involvement in education, there have been very few in-depth 
investigations, suggesting that the press handles Big Philanthropy with “kid gloves”). 
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II. The Bumpy Road to an Equal and Adequate Education 
The modern fight for an equal and adequate education has transpired 
for over a half-century.
24
  The inability of the legal system to fix this highly 
complex problem is unsurprising and has left the door open to new players.  
A. The Importance of Proper School Funding 
In its landmark decision, Brown v. Board of Education,
25
 the United 
States Supreme Court proclaimed the importance of education in a child’s 
life.  In the unanimous decision, Chief Justice Warren wrote:  
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments . . . It is required in the performance of our most basic 
public responsibilities . . . It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship . . . In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 




The opinion’s most well-known holding abolished the separate but equal 
doctrine; however, the Court also alluded to a right to an education, which 
the Court elaborated must “be made available to all on equal terms.”
27
  
Sixty years later the ideals articulated in the Court’s decision are far from 
realized.  
Since Brown, public school funding has been a source of controversy 
in communities, courts, and throughout education circles across the 
country.
28
  Historically, local revenue and taxes have been the main, if not 
only, source of public school funding.
 29
  This system leaves the quality of 
schools to the mercy of the wealth of its surrounding community, with 
wealthier communities being able to afford a highly funded and—most 
would assume—quality education system, while poorer communities 
struggle to adequately fund their school systems.
30
  Although there is 
                                                                                                     
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 26. Id. at 493. 
 27. Id.  
 28. See John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the 
War?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2352–53 (2004) (noting that “battles over school funding 
have been waged on many fronts nationwide”). 
 29. See id. at 2355 (commenting on this traditional method of public school funding). 
 30. See id. (“Public schools were historically supported by local funding, which meant 
that wealthier communities could afford to fund good schools, while poorer communities 
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widespread support for equal access to a high quality public education and 
many states have adopted constitutional provisions requiring legislatures to 
support this notion, contentious arguments arise when attempting to make 
these goals a reality.
31
  Describing this inconsistency between ideals and 
reality, two law professors write:  
[E]galitarian support for providing high quality education for all 
children is attractive, but it becomes problematic when it requires higher 
taxes or the transfer of funds from wealthier districts to poorer districts.  
This clash between the altruistic and egalitarian language in state 
constitutions and the hard truth of local self-interest created a fertile 
ground for funding disputes.
32
 
Therefore, while many people believe that all students should have access 
to a high quality education, these ideals clash with the reality of paying 
higher taxes.
33
  In reaction to widespread resistance to providing equal 
educational opportunities via adjusting taxing schemes, alternative methods 
of funding have developed in the past two decades.
34
  These alternatives 
have also been met with resistance, leaving the question of how to fund the 
equal educational opportunity ideals articulated in Brown unanswered.
35
 
B. The Evolution of Public School Funding Litigation 
Education finance litigation after Brown has progressed in three 
waves.
36
  From the late 1960’s to 1973, plaintiffs first sought to have courts 
mandate that children were entitled to equal educational opportunities and 
equal school funding under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
37
  In Serrano v. Priest,
38
 a landmark decision handed down by 
                                                                                                     
could afford only poor schools or no schools.”). 
 31. See id. (“The more powerful the constitutional command to support a high quality 
education for all children, though, the greater the contrast between the constitutional ideal 
and the political reality.”). 
 32. Id. at 2355–56. 
 33. See id.  
 34. See infra Part IV (discussing the rise of private funding in public education). 
 35. See Dayton & Dupre, supra note 28, at 2358 (“As a result, civil rights advocates 
began to press for judicial mandates for school funding equity, focusing on the critical issue 
left unaddressed in Brown: inequities in public school funding.”). 
 36. See Carlee Poston Escue, William E. Thro & R. Craig Wood, Some Perspectives 
on Recent School Finance Litigation, 268 EDUC. L. REP. 601, 601–03 (2011) (describing 
these three waves). 
 37. See id. at 602 (“[T]he plaintiffs asserted that all children were entitled to have the 
same amount of money spent on their education and/or that children were entitled to equal 
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the Supreme Court of California, plaintiffs successfully challenged the 
funding of California public schools on the grounds that wide disparities 
resulting from the dependence on local property taxes violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.
39
  This case presented issues such as whether education 
was a fundamental right and whether strict scrutiny applied to funding 
questions.
40
 These questions became key considerations as other states 
considered the question of how to fairly finance public education in 
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause.
41
 
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court finally considered the issue 
of whether education was a fundamental right guaranteed by the Equal 
Protection Clause after several other states followed California’s lead.
42
  In 
San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez,
43
 the Court held that education 
was not a fundamental right because it was not explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution.
44
  Accordingly, the Court concluded strict 
scrutiny could not be applied to challenges concerning state laws regulating 
school funding.
45
  The Court reasoned that despite the undeniable 
importance of education, it could not impede on states’ social and economic 
legislation when education was not protected by the Constitution.
46
  In 
                                                                                                     
educational opportunities (‘equity suit’).”). 
 38. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971) (holding that there is a 
fundamental interest in public education). 
 39. See id. at 1244 (stating that “this funding scheme invidiously discriminates against 
the poor because it makes the quality of a child’s education a function of the wealth of his 
parents and neighbors. . . . the right to an education in our public schools is a fundamental 
interest which cannot be conditioned on wealth . . .”). 
 40. See id. 
 41. See Dayton & Dupre, supra note 28, at 2359 (noting that another key issue brought 
up by this decision was “whether the state’s goal of promoting local control constituted a 
sufficient justification for the challenged funding system under the court’s standard of 
review”). 
 42. See id. at 2360 (noting that Minnesota, New Jersey, and Michigan all “struck down 
school finance laws on similar grounds”). 
 43. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (holding that 
education is not a fundamental right that must be afforded strict scrutiny). 
 44. See id. at 35 (“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit 
protection under our Federal Constitution.  Nor do we find any basis for saying it is 
implicitly so protected.”). 
 45. See id. at 37 (“In one further respect we find this a particularly inappropriate case 
in which to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny.”). 
 46. See id. at 35 (noting that “the undisputed importance of education will not alone 
cause this Court to depart from the usual standard of reviewing a State’s social and 
economic legislation” and that the argument connecting education to the success of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments was unpersuasive). 
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addition to impinging on states’ powers, the Court was also concerned with 
judicial activism, noting that a decision in favor of a fundamental right 
would greatly expand the power of the judiciary in an area the legislature is 
better suited to handle.
47
 
Once the Court declared that education was not a fundamental right 
protected by the United States Constitution, plaintiffs shifted their focus to 
state courts.
48
  Similar to their assertions under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
plaintiffs in this second wave of education finance litigation focused on 
“equal guarantee” clauses in state constitutions.
49
  Robinson v. Cahill
50
 was 
the first case in which plaintiffs utilized this strategy.
51
  After delaying its 
opinion in anticipation of Rodriquez, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
ultimately found the state’s tax-based system of funding was 
unconstitutional.
52
  However, the court refused to hold that education was a 
fundamental right protected by the state’s guarantee of substantive due 
process and, rather, held that the state failed to fulfill its educational 
mandate provided in the state constitution.
53
  
In the wake of Robinson, states diverged on declaring education a 
fundamental right. Some courts ruled that education was a fundamental 
right derived from the state’s equal guarantee clause.
54
  For instance, in 
                                                                                                     
 47. See Dayton & Dupre, supra note 28, at 2363 (listing the concerns the Court raised 
which also included criticism over plaintiff’s statistical evidence and the importance of 
judicial deference in areas of social and economic legislation). 
 48. See 2 CRAIG DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: RIGHTS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL 1279 (9th ed. 2013) (“. . . [P]laintiffs abandoned their reliance upon state equal 
protection clauses as a source of rights and shifted their focus to education contained in state 
constitutions.”).  
 49. See Escue, Thro & Wood, supra note 36, at 603 n.6 (commenting that many states 
do not have equal protection clauses and that equal guarantee clauses are often interpreted as 
having the same effect as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 50. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (N.J. 1973) (holding that the state’s system 
of funding public education was unconstitutional under the state’s education article). 
 51. See Escue, Thro & Wood, supra note 36, at 602 (stating that Robinson was the 
beginning of the second wave of public school funding litigation). 
 52. See Dayton & Dupre, supra note 28, at 2365 (noting that the court waited for the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez to be released before releasing its own opinion). 
 53. See Robinson, 303 A.2d at 295 (agreeing with the trial court that the constitutional 
demand which requires the state “to afford all pupils that level of instructional opportunity 
which is comprehended by a thorough and efficient system of education” was not met). 
 54. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W.Va. 1979) (“Certainly, the mandatory 
requirement of ‘a thorough and efficient system of free schools,’ found in Article XII, 
Section 1 of our Constitution, demonstrates that education is a fundamental right in this 
State.”); see also Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989) (“[T]he 
premise of this opinion is that education is a basic, fundamental constitutional right that is 
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Pauley v. Kelly,
55
 the West Virginia Supreme Court was particularly 
explicit in stating that this constitutional right derived from both the state’s 
education mandate and equal protection clause.
56
  Unlike the federal 
judiciary, West Virginia courts believed there to be a natural fundamental 
right to education.
57
  Conversely, in Board of Education v. Nyquist,
58
 the 
plaintiffs altogether failed to convince the court that New York’s public 
school funding violated any aspect of the state constitution even though it 
resulted in disparities in financial support to schools.
59
  The court reasoned 
that the State’s constitutional education provision only required that a 
sound, basic education be provided and that in this case the state had met its 
burden.
60
  Following the lead of Nyquist, other states followed suit, leading 
to a string of losses for plaintiffs fighting for funding equality.
61
 
Finally, after the mixed results of the school funding challenges on 
state equal guarantee grounds, plaintiffs have since focused on challenges 
to state constitutional and statutory educational requirements, similar to the 
successes exemplified in Robinson and Pauley.
62
  However, this has made 
little difference in the rate of plaintiffs’ successes.  Despite a more 
centralized method of attack, plentiful case law, and significant academic 
commentary, “courts continue to struggle with issues concerning 
justiciability, the appropriate constitutional standards, and remedial 
issues.”
63
  In addition to judicial incongruity in approaches to school 
                                                                                                     
available to all children within this Commonwealth.”).  
 55. See Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 878 (holding that the state’s system of education 
funding violated the state’s equal protection clause and education mandate). 
 56. See id. at 871 n.25 (explaining this constitutional right in the State’s education 
mandate and its constitution). 
 57. See id. at 863 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s holding in Rodriquez). 
 58. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 363–64 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that the 
state’s school funding policies do not violate either the Federal or State Constitution). 
 59. See id. at 366 (recognizing that while education is a critical government concern 
which is manifested by the attention it gets from the state legislature and its relevant 
provision in the state constitution, such government concern does not automatically afford 
education decisions a stricter standard of review). 
 60. See id. at 369 (“Interpreting the term education, as we do, to connote a sound basic 
education, we have no difficulty in determining that the constitutional requirement is being 
met in this state . . . .”). 
 61. See Dayton & Dupre, supra note 28, at 2369 (demonstrating this effect by citing 
cases from Maryland, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wisconsin). 
 62. See Escue, Thro & Wood, supra note 36, at 603 (arguing that “the finance system 
is unconstitutional because some schools lack the money to meet minimum standards of 
quality”). 
 63. Id. at 604; see also Dayton & Dupre, supra note 28, at 2378 (explaining that some 
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funding, recent federal legislation has ushered in new methods of school 
funding, further complicating the question of how to properly fund schools 
so as to afford an equal educational opportunity to all students.
64
 
C. A Nation at Risk: The Legislation that Launched the Education Reform 
Movement 
While the fight for equal educational opportunities was a seemingly 
continuous battle in courts across the country, public education was not an 
issue at the forefront of the American political agenda.
65
  That changed in 
1983 with the publication of A Nation at Risk, a report written by the 
National Commission on Excellence in Education.
66
  The report was viewed 
as a “scathing indictment” on the declining state of American public 
education.
67
  Along with an abundance of statistical data concerning 
illiteracy, lowering test scores, and waning writing abilities,
68
 the report 
highlighted the mediocre quality of America’s education system and the 
significant detrimental impact that it could have on the country’s position as 
an industrial and world power.
69
  Diane Ravitch, a renowned education 
expert, argues that this report was responsible for shifting the blame for the 
deteriorating state of the Nation from “shortsighted corporate leadership to 
                                                                                                     
courts have refused jurisdiction to school funding challenges because they consider it to be a 
political question).  
 64. See infra Part II.C. 
 65. See Beatrice Birman, Three Decades of Education Reform: Are We Still “A Nation 
at Risk?”, AM. INST. FOR RESEARCH (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.air.org/resource/three-
decades-education-reform-are-we-still-nation-risk (explaining that early in her career, during 
the early 1980s, the author considered changing careers away from the Department of 
Education because President Reagan campaigned on abolishing the Department on the 
grounds that it constitutes a federal intrusion on state powers). 
 66. See Edward Graham, ‘A Nation at Risk’ Turns 30: Where Did It Take Us?, NAT’L 
EDUC. ASS’N (Apr. 25, 2013), http://neatoday.org/2013/04/25/a-nation-at-risk-turns-30-
where-did-it-take-us/ (quoting Mary Hatwood Futrell, a graduate professor of education and 
former president of the NEA, as saying that the report “catapulted the issue of education 
onto the national agenda” and describing its prominence in national news coverage). 
 67. See id. (describing the public’s reaction to the report).  
 68. See id. (outlining the statistical evidence provided in the report). 
 69. See DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION 
MOVEMENT AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 10 (2014) (“Its basic claim 
was that the American standard of living was threatened by the loss of major manufacturing 
industries . . . to other nations, which the commission attributed to the mediocre quality of 
our public educational system . . . .”). 
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the public schools.”
70
  In addition to bringing education to the national 
spotlight, A Nation at Risk also set the stage for future federal legislation
71
 
and the education reform movement.
72
 
The federal government was largely absent from education until the 
No Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”).
73
  NCLB was an education reform act 
signed into law by George W. Bush in 2002 intended to target many of the 
problems featured in A Nation at Risk.
74
  The law called for increased 
school accountability by mandating nationwide proficiency in reading and 
mathematics by 2014.
75
  Under the law, states are required to monitor every 
school and penalize those that fail to meet their required target by labeling 
them as failing or conducting a state take-over of the school.
76
  Due to the 
impossibly ambitious goal of one hundred percent proficiency and the spike 
in federal funding, NCLB encouraged entrepreneurial opportunities
77
 and 
the expansion of charter schools.
78
 
Following the previous administration’s lead, the Obama 
administration also developed its own set of federal initiatives aimed at 
combating the failures of the education system.  In its “Race to the Top” 
                                                                                                     
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. (noting that since the report’s publication, “federal and state policy makers 
have searched for policy levers with which to raise academic performance”). 
 72. See Graham, supra note 66 (“NEA President Dennis Van Roekel credits A Nation 
At Risk with moving public education to the top of the national agenda, but adds that the 
report also became a catalyst for today’s so-called ‘reform’ movement.”). 
 73. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 10 (describing George H.W. Bush’s aversion to an 
“expanded federal role in education” and the Republican Congress that blocked the Clinton’s 
Administration’s interest in national education standards). 
 74. See Margaret Spellings, 25 Years After A Nation at Risk, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 
(May 2, 2008), http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/research/pubs/risk25.html (quoting the then-
Secretary of the Department of Education’s abstract of a report stating, “A Nation at Risk 
inspired some state-level pioneers to think about standards and accountability in education, 
and put them into practice.  This, in turn, led to the landmark No Child Left Behind Act”).   
 75. See DEP’T OF EDUC., The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 1 (Jan. 7, 2002), 
https://www2.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/execsumm.pdf (providing an overview of the law). 
 76. See id. (detailing the repercussions schools face when they fail to meet adequate 
yearly progress). 
 77. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 12 (pointing out two particular industries that 
emerged overnight because of the federal funding and new mandates: after-school tutoring 
programs and consulting groups that advised schools on how to meet the NCLB standards).  
 78. See id. at 12–13 (noting that the law encouraged charter schools as a remedy for 
low-performing schools); see also id. at 199 (“The demands of NCLB provided grist for 
advocates of the parent trigger.  In communities with high numbers of students who had 
limited English skills or were impoverished, many schools were not on track to meet 
NCLB’s impossible target . . . [t]hus, large numbers of schools were ripe for a parent 
revolution.”). 
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program, the federal government created a national competition in which 
states competed for a piece of a five billion dollar fund.
79
  This program 
departed from the equality-driven ideals in education—exemplified by the 
decades of battles in the judicial system—towards a competition for money, 
which benefitted the rich.
80
  Previous administrations focused on granting 
federal funding to poorer communities to combat the wealth disparities; 
now, federal funding is awarded to districts and states that can write the 
best grant.
81
  Not only does this policy provide advantages to school 
districts that can hire professional grant writers, but Diane Ravitch also 
notes that this, similar to NCLB, has prompted more private investment in 
public education.
82
  Ravitch writes, “In many cases, the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation gave grants to hire professionals to develop applications 
for specific states, which tilted the field toward the applicants favored by 
Gates.”
83
  Both the tumultuous road to education equality and recent federal 
legislation has led to an increase in private investors and education 
reformers, exasperating the fear that the United States is moving further 
away from the ideals articulated in Brown.
84
 
                                                                                                     
 79. Race to the Top is a program implemented by the Department of Education as part 
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Race to the 
Top Fund (June 7, 2013), http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/index.html.  The 
program seeks to award grants to states that meet certain criteria outlined by the federal 
government, such as implementing teacher performance reviews, allowing greater 
availability for the creation of charter schools, and implementing the Common Core 
standards.  Id. The Department of Education states the program’s mission to be, “Race to the 
Top winners will help trail-blaze effective reforms and provide examples for States and local 
school districts throughout the country to follow as they too are hard at work on reforms that 
can transform our schools for decades to come.”  Id.  
 80. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 15 (describing the change in focus of federal 
education policy). 
 81. See id. (“By picking a few winners, the Race to the Top competition abandoned 
the traditional idea of equality of educational opportunity, where federal aid favored districts 
and schools that enrolled students with the highest needs.”). 
 82. See id. (“[A]nd indeed the investment opportunities seemed to grow by leaps and 
bounds after the Obama administration launched its Race to the Top.”). 
 83. Id. at 15. 
 84. See infra Part III.B 
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III. Big Philanthropy’s Involvement with Public Education Financing 
A. The Rise of Big Philanthropy 
Following the Civil War, the number of American millionaires 
significantly increased.
85
  In an effort to not only dispense of their vast 
wealth and avoid thousands of individual pleas for charitable donations, but 
also to affect a positive change in society, some wealthy donors teamed up 
with reformers—individuals and organizations who help philanthropists 
realize their philanthropic goals—to create philanthropic foundations.
86
  By 
the turn of the twentieth century, Big Philanthropy was blossoming in the 
American social and political landscape.
87
  Philanthropies distinguished 
themselves from traditional charities in many ways.
88
  The new 
philanthropy movement was ambitious and national in scope, while 
charities had been traditionally focused on local needs.
89
  Additionally 
unlike traditional charities, Big Philanthropy had access to enormous 
financial resources and was given many benefits of the law so long as the 
assets of the foundations were to be used for the “good of mankind.”
90
   
From the beginning, however, Big Philanthropy faced sharp criticism 
due to its vast power to influence many aspects of American society 
without any form of accountability.
91
  Even the reformers resented 
                                                                                                     
 85. See OLIVIER ZUNZ, PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 8 (2011) (noting that 
recorded millionaires in the United States jumped from 100 in the 1870s to 4,047 in 1892 to 
over 40,000 by 1916). 
 86. See id. at 8–21 (describing reasons why big philanthropic foundations came into 
existence). 
 87. See id. at 22 (“The general-purpose foundation was a genuine American invention, 
a direct outcome of the greater range of options the new rich and associated reformers could 
rely on for adapting philanthropy to society’s changing needs and contributing to public 
policy.  Twenty-seven foundations were in operation by 1915.”). 
 88. See id. at 10 (“Charity had been for the needy; philanthropy was to be for 
mankind.”). 
 89. See id. (noting that philanthropies aimed to play a key role “in promoting national 
unification in Reconstruction and beyond”). 
 90. See id. at 15–17 (discussing New York’s Tilden Act and similar statutes in other 
states, which expanded the laws of charitable trusts making it easier for philanthropies to 
exists so long as their funds be used for the “good of mankind”); Joanne Barkan, Plutocrats 
at Work: How Big Philanthropy Undermines Democracy, DISSENT: A Q. OF POL. AND 
CULTURE (Fall 2013), available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/plutocrats-at-
work-how-big-philanthropy-undermines-democracy (“They were launched, in essence, as 
immense tax-exempt private corporations dealing in good works.”). 
 91. See Barkan, supra note 90 (“But they would do good according to their own lights, 
and they would intervene in public life with no accountability . . . [t]o their many detractors, 
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philanthropists because of their role in the creation of social issues that 
afflicted the country.
92
  Discussing the effects of Big Philanthropy’s 
experimentation of new theories and ideas in today’s society, Joanne 
Barkan writes, “Because they are mostly free to do what they want, mega-
foundations threaten democratic governance and civil society . . . [w]hen a 
foundation project fails . . . the subjects of the experiment suffer, as does 
the general public.  Yet the do-gooders can simply move on to their next 
project.”
93
  While the number of foundations has only increased since the 
late nineteenth century and there has been a boom of growth in the last 
decade,
94




B. The Evolution of Big Philanthropy’s Involvement with Public Education 
Education reform has been a main focus of Big Philanthropy since its 
emergence in American culture.
96
  From the creation of prestigious 
universities,
97
 to bolstering the public education system—especially 
improving the quantity and quality of African Americans’ education
98
—to 
educating the population about diseases and farming techniques,
99
 many 
early philanthropic foundations had education as one of their primary 
focuses.
100
  From their inception during Reconstruction to the mid-1950s, 
                                                                                                     
they looked like centers of plutocratic power that threatened democratic governance.”). 
 92. See ZUNZ, supra note 85, at 49 (“The philanthropists were the titans of industry 
who caused the very afflictions that reformers sought to undo.”). 
 93. Barkan, supra note 90. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See ZUNZ, supra note 85, at 15–17 (noting that the laws that enabled 
philanthropies to become more easily funded had a requirement that the philanthropies serve 
the “good of mankind”).   
 96. See id. at 26–43 (describing the various academic initiatives many of the first big 
philanthropists supported); HELMUT K. ANHEIER & DAVID C. HAMMACK, AMERICAN 
FOUNDATIONS: ROLES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 32 (2010) (stating that Big Philanthropy has been 
involved in public education since 1867). 
 97. See ZUNZ, supra note 85, at 26–30 (discussing big philanthropy’s role in the 
creation of the University of Chicago). 
 98. See id. at 30–39 (illustrating many philanthropists who led initiatives to improve 
African American education between the late nineteenth century through the early twentieth 
century). 
 99. See id. at 41–42 (“The Rockefellers hoped to make their agenda of public health 
and farm productivity a pattern for the world.”). 
 100. See ANHEIER & HAMMACK, supra note 96, at 47 (“The development of public 
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Big Philanthropy generally employed three main strategies to influence 
education policy: infiltrating the State by placing contingencies on funds, 
using their power to influence state policymakers, and introducing their 
own ideas through the national market.
101
 In the past half-century, however, 




Over the past sixty years, public education has gone through a massive 
transformation affecting Big Philanthropy’s strategies and projects.
103
  
Some of the most influential changes to the character of public education 
have been an increase in education laws and mandates, vast expansion of 
public spending on education, and federal intervention into the traditionally 
state and locally-run public education system.
104
  Increased public education 
spending had a profound effect on the way Big Philanthropy spent its 
money because it decreased “the financial leverage afforded by even the 
most generous of foundation grants.”
105
  Instead of contributing most of 
their money to established programs, Big Philanthropy switched to 
developing their own educational goals and began providing grants to 
institutions who would further their initiatives.
106
  Another major 
transformation has been the foundations themselves.  Old names in 
philanthropy—such as Carnegie and Rockefeller—have been replaced with 
newer names such as: the Gates Foundation, the Walton Family 
Foundation, and the Broad Foundation.
107
  With new foundations have 
come new agendas and the new inclination towards social engineering has 
supplanted former goals of building monuments and public institutions.
108
  
                                                                                                     
education in the United States, and state policy concerning access, curriculum, and funding, 
especially in the South, cannot be understood apart from the role played by early American 
foundations.”). 
 101. See id. at 32–33 (introducing the three strategies employed by foundations to 
influence public education from 1867–1950). 
 102. See id. at 52–72 (detailing the adjustments Big Philanthropy has made in light of 
public education’s evolution). 
 103. See id. at 51–53 (describing the change in public education’s focus after World 
War II). 
 104. See id. at 52 (writing that Big Philanthropy “now confront[s] an elaborate set of 
legal constraints . . . greatly expanded public spending . . . [and an] increase in federal 
intervention . . . ”). 
 105. Id. at 52. 
 106. See id. (“By midcentury, grants began to shift from support of established 
programs (libraries, arts education) to investment in instructional innovation.”). 
 107. See id. (noting the correlation between the evolution of education and the 
transition of foundations involved in public education funding). 
 108. See id. at 57–58 (“At the same time, newly prominent foundations—notably, the 
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C. Today’s Big Philanthropy and Public Education 
Together, philanthropies across the United States have contributed 
almost four billion dollars to primary and secondary education reform.
109
  
While four billion dollars may seem like an insignificant portion of the 
over 525 billion dollars spent on public education each year,
110
 this money 
has a powerful influence.
111
  Unlike taxpayer money aimed at school 
operations, the money spent by Big Philanthropy “is where policy is 
shaped and changed,” notes Joanne Barkan.
112
  Barkan argues that in the 
past decade Big Philanthropy has been able to steer the national education 
debate and determine education policy at all levels of government based 
on donors’ vision of reform.
113
 
Big Philanthropy is open about its commitment to implementing its 
own theories of educational change.  For example, the Walton Family 
Foundation—one of the largest philanthropic foundations involved in 
education reform—has specified particular initiatives funded by the 158 
million dollars the foundation spent on education reform in 2012.
114
  
These initiatives included investments in charter schools, teacher 
effectiveness, and replacement of low-performing schools.
115
  The Gates 
Foundation—perhaps the largest philanthropic contributor to education 
reform—states that its focus is primarily on teacher effectiveness, 
implementation of the Common Core,
116
 and technological innovation in 
                                                                                                     
Gates and Walton Family foundations—were engaging with new educational issues with 
growing intensity and generosity.  These newer participants brought not only new funds but 
new theories of change.”). 
 109. Billionaires, supra note 23. 
 110. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS: SCHOOL YEAR 2010–11 (FISCAL YEAR 
2011) (Sept. 2013) (categorizing the expenditures of public elementary and secondary school 
systems by state). 
 111. See Billionaires, supra note 23 (describing the influence of this money). 
 112. See Barkan, supra note 90. 
 113. See Billionaires, supra note 21 (“A few billion dollars in private foundation 
money, strategically invested every year for a decade, has sufficed to define the national 
debate on education; sustain a crusade for a set of mostly ill-conceived reforms; and 
determine public policy at the local, state, and national levels.”). 
 114. See THE WALTON FAMILY FOUND., Education Reform, 
http://www.waltonfamilyfoundation.org/educationreform (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) 
(specifying the investment strategies and particular initiatives that the Foundation employs). 
 115. Id. 
 116. The Common Core is an initiative to set nationwide standards and assessments for 
education.  See Common Core State Standards Initiative, Implementing the Common Core 
State Standards, http://www.corestandards.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). “The standards 
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the classroom.
117




D. Criticism of Big Philanthropy’s Involvement in Public Education 
 Critics note that today’s philanthropies seek to infuse their own ideas 
into education in an effort to make systemic changes they prefer and are 
“more interested in disrupting the status quo” than previous generations of 
philanthropists.
119
  While these foundations use objective, even inspired 
language to describe their initiatives, critics view this as a veil over what 
Big Philanthropy is really promoting: charter schools, standardized testing, 
teacher evaluations based on standardized test scores, and putting CEOs in 
school leadership positions.
120
  Describing the nature of Big Philanthropy’s 
involvement in public education, Kenneth Saltman, a professor who 
specializes in the privatization of education, writes:  
Venture philanthropy treats schooling as a private consumable service 
and promotes business remedies, reforms, and assumptions with regard 
to public schooling . . . the public and civic roles of public schooling 
have become nearly overtaken by the economistic neoliberal perspective 
that views public schooling as principally a matter of producing workers 
and consumer for the economy and for global economic competition.
121
 
                                                                                                     
are designed to be robust and relevant to the real world, reflecting the knowledge and skills 
that our young people need for success in college and careers and prepare students to be 
successful in a global economy.” Id. 
 117. See BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., What We Do: College Ready Education 
Strategy Overview, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/US-Program/College-
Ready-Education (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (describing the Foundation’s priorities). 
 118. See infra Part III.D. 
 119. See JACK SCHNEIDER, EXCELLENCE FOR ALL: HOW A BREED OF REFORMERS IS 
TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 37 (2011) (“[W]hereas earlier philanthropically 
funded efforts had been characterized by an ‘emphasis on piecemeal accomplishments,’ 
these deep-pocketed benefactors were more focused on ‘systematic impact and replicable 
models’—much as they had been in their work in the private sector.”). 
 120. See Jonathan Pelto, Funding “Education Reform”: The Big Three Foundations, 
PUBLIC SCHOOL SHAKEDOWN (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.publicschoolshakedown.org/funding-
education-reform (discussing the initiatives of the big three foundations in education reform: 
The Gates Foundation, The Walton Foundation, and the Eli Broad Foundation). 
 121. Kenneth Saltman, The Rise of Venture Philanthropy and the Ongoing Neoliberal 
Assault on Public Education: The Case of the Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation, 16 
WORKPLACE 53, 53–54 (2009); see also Peter Buffet, The Charitable-Industrial Complex, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/27/opinion/the-charitable-
industrial-complex.html?_r=0 (“And with more business-minded folks getting into the act, 
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While it appears that a sharp divide exists between those on the inside and 
those on the outside concerning what these foundations are actually doing, 
even some on the inside question the impact of Big Philanthropy.  Peter 
Buffet, son of Warren Buffet—one of the wealthiest men in the world—
sheds light on what he calls “Philanthropic Colonialism.”
122
 Buffet explains 
that after his father gave him a foundation to run he quickly realized a 
critical flaw in these foundations’ methods: they cultivate solutions to major 
social issues in a vacuum and then try to transplant the result without 
“regard for culture, geography or societal norms.”
123
  In addition, Buffet 
argues that not only do philanthropic acts have unintended, detrimental side 
effects, but more worrisome is that these foundations exist as a system for 




Aside from critical denouncements, evidence shows—and foundations 
have admitted—that some of these initiatives cultivated in a vacuum have 
indeed failed.
125
  At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the small 
school initiative gained momentum when the Gates Foundation endorsed 
this initiative as one of its principal sources of education reform.
126
  
Proclaiming the American public education system broken, the Gates 
Foundation spent over two billion dollars convincing high schools to 
replace their larger failing schools with smaller, more focused schools.
127
  
The goal was to provide students with more individual attention;
128
 
however, these schools were unable to provide a balanced curriculum.
129
  
                                                                                                     
business principles are trumpeted as an important element to add to the philanthropic sector.  
I now hear people ask, ‘what’s the R.O.I.?’ when it comes to alleviating human suffering, as 
if return on investment were the only measure of success.”). 
 122. See Buffet, supra note 121 (describing his experiences after his father gave him his 
own foundation to run). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Bill Gates Admits That Small Schools are Not the Answer, SCHARGEL 
CONSULTING GRP. BLOG (Jan. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Gates Admits], http://www. 
schargel.com/2009/01/27/bill-gates-admits-that-small-schools-are-not-the-answer/ (illustrating 
the Gates’ Foundation’s failure with the small school initiative). 
 126. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 119, at 56 (noting that the small school initiative was 
endorsed by the Gates Foundation and federal government at the beginning of the 21st 
century). 
 127. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 40 (discussing the money spent by the Gates 
Foundation). 
 128. See Billionaires, supra note 23 (describing the desired goals behind the small 
school movement). 
 129. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 40 (noting the failures of the initiative). 
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After eight years of promoting and funneling money into this movement, 
the Gates Foundation admitted that it had failed.
130
  Reflecting upon the 
small school movement in the past decade, Deborah Meier, who is 
considered the founder of this particular reform, is embarrassed about the 
direction Big Philanthropy took the movement.
131
  Rather than promoting 
the democratic leadership model that she had envisioned in order to give 
teachers more power, Meier notes that the movement has only been 
successful in making school administrators more powerful, further 




The small school initiative is one of many experiments in education 
reform promoted by Big Philanthropy.  Two current initiatives—the 
charter school movement and parent trigger legislation—demonstrate Big 
Philanthropy’s overwhelming power and the effects of its failed 
educational experiments.  By analyzing these two current movements, it 
becomes evident that while Big Philanthropy wields considerable 
influence over the direction of education in the United States, there are 
not enough legal mechanisms to control the negative aspects of this 
educational reform model.
133
  While their money may be purposefully 
spent based on research and advice from prominent think tanks, 
unintended detrimental consequences are emerging from these solutions 
created in a vacuum.
134
   
                                                                                                     
 130. See Gates Admits, supra note 125 (containing quotes from a Bill Gates speech 
indicating that the small school initiative had failed); Billionaires, supra note 23 (noting the 
announcement the Gates Foundation made indicating that this movement hadn’t produced 
strong results). 
 131. See Mike Klonsky, An Interview With Deborah Meier on the Small-School 
Movement, HUFFINGTON POST, (May 11, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-
klonsky-phd/deborah-meier-small-schools_b_859362.html (“I’m embarrassed about the 
people who have been touting small schools in the last 10 years . . . [they] are now using it to 
privatize public schools . . . [i]t is painful to watch.”). 
 132. See id. (“Those at the top now have more power to intimidate. ‘Reform’ does not 
now mean increasing the power of parents or kids or teachers.”). 
 133. See infra Part IV. 
 134. See ANHEIER & HAMMACK, supra note 96, at 61 (“Even the clearest and most 
specific design, however, has little chance of success if it is at cross purposes with the 
interests of those responsible for its implementation.”). 
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IV: Two Case Studies on the Effect of Big Philanthropy’s Financing of 
Public Education 
A. Charter Schools 
1. The Purpose and Growth of Charter Schools 
The charter school movement is one of the most well-known areas in 
which Big Philanthropy seeks to influence the public education landscape.  
One of myriad definitions describes charter schools as “public schools that 
are granted a specific amount of autonomy, determined by state law and/or 
the specific charter, to make decisions concerning the organizational 
structure, curriculum, and educational emphasis of their school.”
135
 Similar 
to traditional public schools, charter schools receive funding from local, 
state, and federal governments.
136
  Additionally, while charter schools often 
require potential students to go through admission processes, according to 
the law they cannot charge tuition and any admission process must “fair and 
open.”
137




Over the last two decades, the growth of charter schools has erupted, 
with over forty states passing legislation that encourages this reform.
139
  
Originally conceived by a former principal, the idea of charter schools 
began as a method for teachers to explore alternative methods of 
education.
140
  The early backers of charter schools envisioned a small 
grassroots movement in which a limited number of schools would serve as 
contained hubs of educational experimentation where new initiatives and 
ideas could be tested before being utilized in the mainstream public school 
                                                                                                     
 135. Joseph Murphy & Catherine Dunn Shiffman, Understanding and Assessing the 
Charter School Movement 4 (2002). 
 136. See Charter Schools 101: The Most Frequently Asked Questions, Nat’l Alliance 
for Pub. Charter Schs., http://www.publiccharters.org/About-Charter-Schools/Frequently-
Asked-Questions.aspx (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (describing the basic mechanics of charter 
schools). 
 137. See Closing the Achievement Gap: Charter School FAQ, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/closingtheachievementgap/faq.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) 
(describing the charter school process). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Christopher A. Lubienski & Peter C. Weitzel, Two Decades of Charter 
Schools, in The Charter School Experiment: Expectations, Evidence, and Implications 1, 1 
(Christopher A. Lubienski & Peter C. Weitzel eds., 2010) (illustrating the growth of charter 
schools in the last twenty years). 
 140. See id. at 4–5 (detailing the initial idea of charter schools and its original aims). 
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system.
141
  This, however, is far from the reality of charter schools today.
142
  
Today, charter schools serve about two million children and counting.
143
  In 
a radical departure from its grassroots beginnings, charter schools are now 
seen as challengers to public schools, have strong political ties to Capitol 
Hill, and are viewed as a “market-oriented” approach to education.
144
  The 
dramatic growth and shifting of expectations has opened the door for 
private donors to wield their influence in spite of the growing evidence of 
the detrimental effects charter schools have on schools and students.
145
 
2. Differentiating Between Charter Schools and Traditional Public Schools 
A key difference between public and charter schools is charter 
schools’ reliance on private funding.
146
 Charter school funding is often not 
equal to funding of similarly situated traditional schools.
147
  On average, 
charter schools receive sixty-one percent of the government funding that 
their district counterparts receive.
148
  This results in charter schools being 
underfunded and, therefore, needing to focus some of their energy on 
obtaining funds elsewhere in order to adequately meet their students’ 
needs.
149
 One solution charter schools continually turn to, and have come to 
                                                                                                     
 141. See id. at 5 (“Charter advocates at the time envisioned small-scale, autonomous 
schools run by independent mom-and-pop operators who would be best positioned to 
respond to local community needs.”). 
 142. See id. (contrasting the idealistic goals of early charter school advocates with the 
realities of today). 
 143. Ravitch, supra note 69, at 158. 
 144. See Lubienski & Weitzel, supra note 139, at 4–5 (explaining the charter school 
movement’s transition from grassroots ideals to political powerhouse).  
 145. See infra Part 4.A.4. 
 146. See Terence Chea, Charter Schools Expand with Public, Private Money, 
Huffington Post (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/21/charter-
schools-expand_n_812183.html (discussing the expansion of charter schools across the 
country with the help of wealthy private donors). 
 147. See Closing the Achievement Gap, supra note 137 (noting that in a number of 
states, including Minnesota, New Jersey, and Colorado, charter schools do not receive the 
full equivalent of funding that their public counterparts receive); Jeanette M. Curtis, Note, A 
Fighting Chance: Inequalities in Charter School Funding and Strategies for Achieving 
Equal Access to Public School Funds, 55 How. L.J. 1057, 1067–69 (2012) (discussing the 
inequality of funding between charter schools and traditional schools). 
 148. Just the FAQs—Charter Schools, The Ctr. For Educ. Reform (Mar. 15, 2012), 
http://www.edreform.com/2012/03/just-the-faqs-charter-schools/ (basing this conclusion on 
nationwide averages that demonstrate charter schools receive $7,612 per pupil and 
traditional public schools receive $10,441 per pupil). 
 149. See Curtis, supra note 147, at 1070–71 (discussing how schools handle being 
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rely on, is Big Philanthropy.
150
  In fact, the recent growth of charter schools 
nationwide has been driven by charter school organizations that are funded 
by Big Philanthropy.
151
  Critics see Big Philanthropy’s funding as a part of 
a corporate reform movement, which seeks to privatize public education.
152
  
Describing her cynical view of Big Philanthropy’s intentions, Ravitch 
writes that its underlying goal is to “replace public education with a system 
in which public funds are withdrawn from public oversight to subsidize 
privately managed charter schools, voucher schools, online academies, for-
profit schools, and other private vendors.”
153
  Yet others, including the 
philanthropists themselves, see Big Philanthropy’s involvement as a 
beneficial bolster to the failing public education system.
154
  While the 
debate concerning the effectiveness continues, it is helpful to look at the 
impact the proliferation of charter schools has had on the public education 
system. 
3. The Unique Opportunities Charter Schools Afford Big Philanthropy 
First, charter schools give Big Philanthropy an opportunity to have 
uncommon power over public education through their exemption from 
various regulations to which traditional public schools are bound.
155
  
Charter schools were designed to have the freedom and autonomy to meet 
the goals of their unique charter mission.
156
  To accomplish this, many 
                                                                                                     
underfunded). 
 150. See Ravitch, supra note 69, at 158 (noting that many major foundations, such as 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, The Broad Foundation, the Michael and Susan Dell 
Foundation, and more have “lavished funding on the expansion of charter schools and 
charter school chains”). 
 151. See Curtis, supra note 147, at 1070–71. (“Much of the growth is being driven by 
charter management organizations that have received multimillion-dollar grants from the 
Obama administration and foundations funded by philanthropists such as Gates, Charles 
Schwab, Eli Broad and Reed Hastings.”). 
 152. See Ravitch, supra note 69, at 19–31 (arguing that corporate reformers, including 
wealthy philanthropists, aim to privatize education). 
 153. Id. at 31. 
 154. See Who We Are, Bill & Melinda Gates Found., 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/who-we-are (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (explaining the 
foundation’s goal of changing public education to meet current demands of society). 
 155. See Murphy & Shiffman, supra note 135, at 4 (evidencing charter schools as 
exceptions to the rules in a definition describing them as “freed from rules but accountable 
for results”); Ravitch, supra note 69, at 159 (“Charter schools are deregulated and free from 
most state laws other than those governing health and safety.”). 
 156. See Gary Miron, Performance of Charter Schools and Implications for Policy 
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charter schools are exempt from most state and local education regulations 
in exchange for different forms of accountability.
157
  For instance, charter 
schools are free to construct their own disciplinary policies and admission 
requirements, avoid financial oversight traditionally imposed on public 
schools, and have different standards for teacher certification.
158
  Without 
these legislative and regulatory boundaries, Big Philanthropy has been able 
to more readily assert its educational goals.
159
 
Some critics believe that Big Philanthropy and major corporations
160
 
view education as a market ripe for exploitation.
161
  Because of the 
deregulation surrounding charter schools and their need for outside funding, 
Big Philanthropy is taking advantage of charter schools’ vulnerable 
position.
162
  Critics note, “their interest was not philanthropy but making 
money on real estate deals and educational services, taking advantage of 
federal tax credits and a steady flow of no-risk public funding.”
163
  
Sometimes referred to as venture philanthropists, these more aggressive 
philanthropies focus on return on investment, rather than traditional 
altruistic interests in school funding.
164
  To increase profits and notoriety 
via expansion of charter schools, donors are suggested to donate not only to 
the charter schools themselves, but also to help fund studies that prove the 
effectiveness of charters and support politicians who favor the charter 
                                                                                                     
Makers, in The Charter School Experiment: Expectations, Evidence, and Implications 173–
74 (Christopher A. Lubienski & Peter C. Weitzel eds., 2010) (explaining why charter 
schools have different forms of accountability). 
 157. See id. (stating three alternative methods of accountability and how they are 
applied in the charter school context). 
 158. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 159 (illustrating the effects of deregulation). 
 159. See Barkan, supra note 90 (noting that lack of limits on political activity has 
crippled oversight).  
 160. Corporate America is considered another culprit of this practice, but will not be 
discussed in this Note. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 160–61 (discussing big corporations’ 
involvement in exploiting charter schools). 
 161. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 161 (“Other financiers saw public education as a 
potentially lucrative opportunity.  They looked at the hundreds of billions of taxpayers 
dollars spent each year on schools and saw a market waiting to be exploited.”). 
 162. See Billionaires, supra note 23 (detailing the desperate measures some states took 
in order to find adequate funding for charter schools). 
 163. RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 161. 
 164. See Janelle T. Scott & Catherine C. DiMartino, Hybridized, Franchised, 
Duplicated, and Replicated: Charter Schools and Management Organizations, in THE 
CHARTER SCHOOL EXPERIMENT: EXPECTATIONS, EVIDENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS 187 
(Christopher A. Lubienski & Peter C. Weitzel eds., 2010) (describing the correlation of these 
more “aggressive” philanthropists with the increase in charter schools around the country). 
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school movement.
165
  With the focus shifting from educational outcomes to 
profit-driven success models, charter schools often see themselves in 
competition, rather than cooperation, with public schools.
166
 
Furthermore, charter schools exist in a state of legal ambiguity.  It is 
unclear whether charter schools are considered state or private actors due to 
their autonomy from traditional school regulation.  Because charter schools 
teeter on the line between public and private, courts and legislatures 
struggle with how to establish and regulate them in order to ensure charter 
schools are held accountable for providing a proper education.
167
  This 
uncertainty has resulted in increased litigation.
168
  For example, due to 
unclear legislation concerning charters’ legal statuses, courts must spend 
time determining whether laws that are traditionally applied to public 
schools are equally applicable to charter schools.
169
  Complicating the 
public and private dilemma is the rise of Big Philanthropy’s role in 
education.
170
  With an increase in private funding to charter schools, the line 
between public and private has further blurred, making it more difficult for 
courts to interpret how laws and regulations apply to charter schools.
171
 
4. The Effects of Charter Schools on Communities and Students 
Some believe charter schools only exacerbate lingering social and 
educational problems.
172
  Evidence has accumulated demonstrating that 
                                                                                                     
 165. See id. (discussing the suggestions of The Philanthropy Roundtable, which is a 
group that supports school choice). 
 166. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 178 (discussing this change in focus). 
 167. See Julia L. Davis, Contracts, Control and Charter Schools: The Success of 
Charter Schools Depends on Stronger Nonprofit Board Oversight to Preserve Independence 
and Prevent Domination by For-Profit Management Companies, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 
8 (“From a legal perspective, charter schools occupy a shadowy terrain between purely 
‘public’ and ‘private’ education, forcing state legislatures and the courts to develop rules to 
ensure the accountability that the public expects of public education . . . .”). 
 168. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Charter Schools and Charter School Officials: Have 
States Adequately Defined the Status and Responsibilities of These Schools, 269 EDUC. LAW 
REP. 443, 445–47 (Sept. 15, 2011) (“[T]he failure of state legislatures to define the extent to 
which charter schools have the same status and liability as public school districts invites 
unnecessary litigation.”).  
 169. See id. (illustrating this problem with examples including how courts differ on 
whether charter schools qualify for qualified immunity). 
 170. See Davis, supra note 167, at 8 (referencing the increase in non-profit and for-
profit organizations involvement in education). 
 171. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 172. See e.g., Chea, supra note 146 (skimming the surface of some of the social issues 
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charter schools specifically exclude students with disabilities, harm the 
effectiveness of local public schools, and foster racial resegregation.
173
  
While evidence of these failures amass, Big Philanthropy continues to 
pump money and resources into the charter school movement.
174
 
Charter schools see two problems with students with disabilities: they 
are expensive and often have lower test scores.
175
  While eleven percent of 
the national student population has a disability, on average, only eight 
percent of the charter school student population has a disability.
176
  This 
number may be even more skewed when it is considered that most charter 
schools are in urban areas where the percentage of students with disabilities 
is greater.
177
  Because of deregulation, charter schools are able to refuse to 
admit students with disabilities; and they do.
178
 
Charter schools can also impact the success of traditional schools.
179
  
An example best illustrates the negative effects charter schools have on 
local public schools.  The Inglewood School District, located southwest of 
Los Angeles, was once touted as an exemplar school system, receiving 
national notoriety.
180
  Claiming to employ basic tactics such as phonics and 
a no-nonsense discipline policy, Inglewood—despite its high poverty level 
and limited financial resources—posted high test scores.
181
  However, after 
the introduction of charter schools funded by Big Philanthropy in 2000, this 
                                                                                                     
critics claim are a result of charter school growth). 
 173. See id. (“[B]ut critics say charters siphon students and resources away from 
traditional public schools, result in greater racial segregation, block access to certain groups 
of students and operate without proper oversight.”). 
 174. See THE WALTON FAMILY FOUND., 2013 GRANT REPORT, 
http://www.waltonfamilyfoundation.org/about/2013-grant-report (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) 
(stating that in 2013 the Walton Family Foundation contributed over 164 million dollars to 
education reform, much of that money going to advance one of their primary initiatives: 
charter schools). 
 175. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 175 (“These students are expensive to educate and, 
depending on their disability, may lower a school’s test scores.”). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. (suggesting that the disparity between the national population of students 
with disabilities and the charter school population of students with disabilities is actually a 
lot greater than what the numbers reveal). 
 178. See id. (“Most charters refuse students with severe disabilities . . . .”). 
 179. See id. at 177 (“The charter issue cannot be fully assessed without taking into 
account the impact of charters on the local public schools.”). 
 180. See id. (noting that some described the school district as the “Inglewood Miracle” 
and that George W. Bush visited the school after one of the district’s elementary schools was 
named among the nation’s best). 
 181. See id. (“Inglewood, California, was once an iconic district for conservatives, who 
warmly praised its high test scores despite its high poverty.”). 
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picture drastically changed.
182
  Over the past decade, enrollment in the local 
public schools plunged from eighteen thousand to twelve thousand and 
charter schools are to blame.
183
  The six thousand students Inglewood 
public schools lost have gone to local charter schools.
184
 
This dramatic decrease in student population has had a devastating 
impact on the Inglewood public school system.  Lost enrollment to charter 
schools—which correspondingly causes lost revenue
185
—brought about the 
firing of teachers, reductions in staff, and increased class sizes.
186
  The 
school began to under-perform and test scores plummeted and, in reaction, 
community members called for more charter schools.
187
  As more charter 
schools opened, more high-achieving students left the public schools, 
further crippling test scores and school performance.
188
  Not only does this 
vicious cycle drain public schools of many of their most motivated students 
who have the ability to lift up a classroom discussion or be a positive role 
model to others, it has also left Inglewood facing bankruptcy, takeover by 
the state, and further cuts in spending.
189
  Most concerning is that 
Inglewood is not a unique situation.
190
 
                                                                                                     
 182. See Our School at a Glance, AMINO LEADERSHIP CHARTER HIGH SCH., 
http://www.greendot.org/page.cfm?p=3910 (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (stating that the 
school opened in 2000 and is a Green Dot Public School); see also GREEN DOT PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS, Our Supporters, http://www.greendot.org/page.cfm?p=4137 (last visited Fed. 11, 
2015) (establishing that the foundations who have donated over one million dollars to Green 
Dot include: The Broad Foundation, The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the 
Walton Family Foundation). 
 183. See Rob Kuznia, Inglewood Unified School District at Risk of Being ‘Vaporized,’ 
Administrators Say, DAILY BREEZE NEWS (May 28, 2013, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.dailybreeze.com/general-news/20130529/inglewood-unified-school-district-at-
risk-of-being-vaporized-administrators-say. 
 184. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 177 (“But from 2003 to 2011, the district lost one-
third of its eighteen thousand pupils to charter schools . . . .”). 
 185. When a student leaves a traditional public school to go to a charter school, the 
public school must pay that charter school on a per pupil basis.  See Closing the Achievement 
Gap, supra note 137 (“When a child leaves for a charter school the money follows that 
child.”). 
 186. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 177 (“Because of the lost enrollment and lost 
revenue, the district was forced to lay off teachers and custodians and increase class sizes.”). 
 187. See Kuznia, supra note 183 (describing the effects of decreased enrollment). 
 188. See id. (“The schools under-perform, creating fertile ground for charter schools, 
which tend to take high-achieving students, which takes a further toll on test scores . . . .”).  
 189. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 177 (“At the end of 2012, the state took over the 
Inglewood District, appropriated an emergency loan of $55 million to stave off bankruptcy, 
and installed an interim administrator to take control of the schools and make deep cuts in 
spending.”). 
 190. See id. at 177–78 (describing the similar issue which has plagued Pennsylvania, 
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Additionally, there is a fear that the growth in charter schools has led 
to the resegregation of many school districts.  Charter schools are prone to 
higher levels of segregation and racial disparities than traditional public 
schools.
191
  Social scientists found that seventy percent of African 
American charter school students attended highly segregated minority 
schools while only thirty-four percent of African American public school 
students attended highly segregated schools.
192
  Additionally, African 
American students in charter schools are twice as likely as African 
American students in traditional public schools to be in a school with less 
than ten percent white students.
193
  The authors of the study conclude, 
“Although these schools have the potential to transcend high residential 
segregation created by neighborhood assignment and school district 
boundary lines, in many cases they are even more segregated than regular 
public schools.”
194
   
The Osseo Area Schools in the suburbs of Minneapolis exemplify this 
resegregation.  The school district’s student body has experienced a drastic 
change in racial composition over the last decade.
195
  One factor causing 
this change is the presence of charter schools.
196
  The public school district 
noted that almost one-third of the student population lost was to charter 
schools.
197
  More importantly the school found “that a larger proportion of 
students of color than white students were opting out of the district for 
                                                                                                     
Ravitch writes, “The public schools in the district have lost so much funding as a result that 
they are near bankruptcy and may eventually be forced to close, with their remaining 
students handed over to private charter corporations”). 
 191. See Erica Frankenberg, Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & Jia Wang, Choice Without 
Equity: Charter School Segregation and the Need for Civil Rights Standards, CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROJECT 80 (Jan. 2010) [hereinafter Choice Without Equity], 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/choice-
without-equity-2009-report/frankenberg-choices-without-equity-2010.pdf (“This analysis of 
recent data finds that charter schools are more racially isolated than traditional public 
schools in virtually every state and large metropolitan area in the nation.”). 
 192. Id. at 37. 
 193. Id.  
 194. See Erica Frankenberg & Chungmei Lee, Charter Schools and Race: A Lost 
Opportunity for Integrated Education, EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 36 (Sept. 5, 2003) 
[hereinafter A Lost Opportunity], available at http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/260/386 
(conducting a study on segregation patterns in charter schools). 
 195. See Baris Gumus-Dawes, Myron Orfield & Thomas Luce, Dividing Lines: East 
Versus West in Minneapolis Suburbs, in THE RESEGREGATION OF SUBURBAN SCHOOLS 114–
18 (Erica Frankenberg & Gary Orfield eds., 2012) (detailing that changes observed in this 
school district towards resegregation). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
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charter schools, perhaps because of the presence of ethnically themed 
charter schools.”
198
  Despite these concerns, the number of charter schools 
continues to rapidly increase without hesitation.
199
  As one scholar 
concludes, “The charter school movement has been a major political 
success, but it has been a civil rights failure.”
200
 
Many reasons are offered to account for racial disparities.  One reason 
for the intensified segregation for African Americans in charter schools is 
the location of these schools.
201
  Many charter schools are located in 
neighborhoods that are already highly segregated.
202
  Additionally, some 
argue that because people do not understand their growing impact, charter 
schools are not challenged when they do not comply with federal civil 
rights statutes.
203
  Another argument blames charter school authorizers—
those who sponsor the creation and operation of a charter school—for not 
using their discretion to avoid civil rights issues; suggesting that the 
authorizers have the power and discretion to stop the perpetuation of 
segregation.
204
  Other legislative decisions also affect charter school 
diversity: location of the school, transportation, and funding.
205
 
A growing number of states have reacted to segregation in charter 
schools by enacting racial balancing provisions in their authorizing 
                                                                                                     
 198. Id. at 118. 
 199. See Choice Without Equity, supra note 191, at 80 (noting the continued growth of 
charter schools). 
 200. Id. at 1. 
 201. See A Lost Opportunity, supra note 194, at 36 (noting that one of the possible 
reasons for the study’s conclusion is that many charter schools are located in segregated 
neighborhoods). 
 202. See id.  
 203. See Joy Resmovits, Charter School Segregation Target of New Report, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/22/charter-
school-education-segregation-equity-race-legislation_n_1295043.html (quoting an argument 
made by Myron Orfield, a professor at University of Minnesota who studies charter school 
segregation at a local level); see also Choice Without Equity, supra note 191, at 81 (“States 
often have weak civil rights and equity policies regarding charter school establishment and 
enrollment . . . .”). 
 204. See Julie F. Mead & Preston C. Green III, Chartering Equity: Using Charter 
School Legislation and Policy to Advance Equal Educational Opportunity, NAT’L EDUC. 
POL’Y CTR. 11–12 (Feb. 2012), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/PB-CharterEquity_0.pdf 
(suggesting what charter school authorizers should do to avoid continued segregation in 
charter schools). 
 205. See Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & Erica Frankberg, Does Law Influence Charter 
School Diversity? An Analysis of Federal and State Legislation, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 321, 
347–51 (2011) (discussing these seemingly race-neutral decisions’ effects on charter school 
diversity). 
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statutes.
206
  Generally, these provisions are designed to prevent racial 
segregation and states vary in their approach to achieving this goal.
207
 Some 
provisions require findings that racial balance will be achieved before the 
school is authorized,
208
 while others require racial balance to be a factor 
when considering the effect of establishing a charter school.
209
  However, 
the constitutionality of these provisions has been questioned,
210
 following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1.
211
  In a plurality opinion, the Court declared 
there to be two compelling purposes that enable a public school district to 
use racial classifications: remedying the effects of past discrimination and 
diversity in higher education.
212
  The Court specifically stated that racial 
balancing was not a compelling interest.
213
 However, in Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence, which provided the majority’s key swing vote, he recognized 




It is unclear how Parents Involved applies to charter school provisions.  
Two scholars suggest that based on principles articulated in the decision, 
hortatory racial balancing provisions would be considered constitutional, 
but mandatory racial balancing provisions could encounter constitutional 
challenges.
215
  Unlike mandatory racial balancing provisions, hortatory 
                                                                                                     
 206. See Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, Charter Schools: Racial 
Balancing Provisions and Parents Involved, 61 ARK. L. REV. 1, 22 (2008) (citing fourteen 
states that have enacted such provisions). 
 207. See id. at 22–33 (outlining the differences in the implementation of racial 
balancing provisions among the fourteen different states that have enacted such provisions). 
 208. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605 (2014). 
 209. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-226h (West 2014). 
 210. See generally Oluwole & Green, supra note 206 (discussing the impact of Parents 
Involved has on charter school racial balancing provisions). 
 211. Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 747 (2007) (holding that 
racial classification employed by public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because no compelling interests were presented). 
 212. See id. at 702–03 (describing the two compelling interests available to public 
schools when using racial classifications).  
 213. See id. at 730 (“Grutter itself reiterated that ‘outright racial balancing’ is ‘patently 
unconstitutional.’”). 
 214. See id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In the administration of public schools 
by the state and local authorities it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools 
and to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its 
racial composition.”). 
 215. See Oluwole & Green, supra note 206, at 52 (stating their conclusion). 
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provisions merely encourage racial balancing.
216
  The hortatory provisions 
aim to achieve this balance by finding methods that result in a more racially 
balanced student body.
217
  Due to the “ostensible latitude” provided by state 
laws that reflect hortatory provisions, these scholars argue that the Court 
will be more likely to accept these provisions because they do not reflect 
the required racial quotas at issue in Parents Involved.
218
  Mandatory 
provisions, however, will likely not survive the strict scrutiny test of 
judicial review because of their similarity to the racial quotas in Parents 
Involved, which were held to have violated the Equal Protection Clause.
219
  
Yet, because of charter schools’ hazy legal status, it is unclear how directly 
Parents Involved will apply to charter school racial balancing provisions. 
Educators are worried about the effect this continued segregation has 
on students.  The perpetuation of the achievement gap has been partially 
blamed on continued segregation.
 220
  Additionally, segregation is also 
linked to high dropout rates, the school-to-prison pipeline, high teacher 
turnover, and inadequate access to a challenging curriculum, technology, 
and educational and employment opportunities.
221
  While charter schools 
only serve a small percentage of students nationwide, they are often located 




Charter schools give Big Philanthropy a unique and powerful way to 
affect change in the public education landscape.
223
  Instead of being bound 
by traditional rules and regulations, Big Philanthropy is able to effectuate 
its goals and even exploit the public school system with little oversight 
from government bodies.
224
  The state of legal ambiguity in which charter 
schools exist only further enables Big Philanthropy to wield its muscles.
225
  
                                                                                                     
 216. See id. at 33 (describing the two classifications of racial balancing). 
 217. See id. (noting the difference between mandatory and hortatory racial balance 
provisions). 
 218. See id. at 46 (describing the relationship between hortatory provisions and the 
Parents Involved decision). 
 219. See id. at 46–52 (describing the relationship between mandatory provisions and 
Parents Involved). 
 220. See Siegel-Hawley & Frankberg, supra note 205, at 325–29 (detailing the harms of 
racial isolation and the benefits of diverse schools). 
 221. See Mead & Green, supra note 204, at 5 (examining issues associated with racial 
segregation). 
 222. See id. (noting that mandatory provisions would face constitutional challenges). 
 223. See supra Part IV.A. 
 224. See supra notes 155–159 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra notes 167–170 and accompanying text. 
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Due in part to Big Philanthropy’s influence, charter school growth has 
exploded with little attention being paid to the negative consequences of the 
charter school model.
226
  Public schools left in disarray, blatant exclusion of 
students with disabilities, and racial resegregation are among some of the 
most devastating impacts of the rise of charter schools.
227
  As people 
continue to get on the charter school bandwagon, the need for regulatory 
control and transparency only becomes more important. 
B. Parent Trigger Legislation 
1. Parent Trigger Laws in General 
The effects of Big Philanthropy—good and bad—have been felt within 
schools for well over a decade; but the deep entanglement between Big 
Philanthropy and education legislation is just beginning to surface.
228
  One 
of the newest education reform movements is the parent trigger 
movement.
229
  This movement involves legislation intended to empower 
parents to implement certain remedial measures if their child’s school is 
underperforming.
230
  Parent trigger legislation adopted in California—the 
first state to adopt such legislation—states that if more than half of parents 
at an under-performing school sign a petition, the parents may take control 
of the school.
231
  The law gives parents the ability to control the budget, fire 
staff, and, at its most extreme, turn the school over to a charter school 
organization.
232
  Over twenty-five states have considered these laws and 
                                                                                                     
 226. See supra Part IV.A.4. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See Barkan, supra note 90 (noting that the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC)—which is credited with the rapid popularity of parent trigger legislation—
received a $376,635 grant from The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to further its 
education reforms); see also Gary Cohn, Public Schools, Private Agendas:  Parent 
Revolution, CAPITAL & MAIN (Apr. 2, 2013), http://capitalandmain.com/public-schools-
private-agendas-parent-revolution/ (chronicling the rise of the parent-trigger movement and 
its relation to philanthropic foundations). 
 229. See Cohn, supra note 228. 
 230. See Parent Trigger Laws in the States, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/state-parent-trigger-laws.aspx 
(explaining parent trigger laws and how they are implemented in certain states). 
 231. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 199 (describing the legislation adopted by 
California in 2010). 
 232. See id. (describing the power this legislation affords parents). 
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seven states have adopted them.
233
  The remedial options available to 
aggrieved parents vary from state to state.
234
   
Supporters of the parent-trigger movement argue that these laws 
promote greater parent involvement in the education system while holding 
schools to a higher standard of accountability.
235
  They contend that these 
laws allow parents to bypass the traditionally slow and political methods of 
turning around a low-performing school and are more student-focused.
236
  
Additionally, there seems to be national support for the movement.  A 2012 
Gallop poll indicated widespread support for legislation that gives parents 
power to remove school officials in failing schools via alternative methods 
such as a petition process.
237
  Additionally, a 2012 movie entitled Won’t 
Back Down, starring major Hollywood players Viola Davis and Maggie 
Gyllenhaal, attempted to glamourize parent trigger laws.
238
  Despite the 
movement’s seeming popularity, critics have emerged and amassed 
evidence that questions the effectiveness of these laws.
239
 
To date, evidence of the law’s effective implementation and impact is 
limited.  Despite the law being adopted in seven states, only four attempts 
have been made by parents to take advantage of parent trigger laws to 
reform an underperforming school.
240
  One of the attempts ended in failure 
ultimately leaving the community divided,
241
 while the other three attempts 
                                                                                                     
 233. Parent Trigger Laws in the States, supra note 230. 
 234. See id. (describing the type of power parent trigger laws entrust in the parents). 
 235. See id. (“Advocates argue that parents should have a more active role in how their 
child’s school is managed.”). 
 236. See id. (noting how these laws allow parents to have a “more active role in how 
their child’s school is managed” and that the traditional methods used to turn around a 
school are often politically motivated, rather than driven by the interest in the students). 
 237. WILLIAM J. BUSHAW & SHANE J. LOPEZ, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A NATION DIVIDED, 94 PHI DELTA KAPPA/GALLUP POLL 22 (Sept. 2012), 
available at http://pdkintl.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/5/files/2012-Gallup-poll-full-report.pdf. 
 238. See Greg Toppo, ‘Won’t Back Down’ Highlights Parent Trigger Law For Schools, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 5, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/story/2012-08-
04/schools-parent-takeover/56762688/1 (describing the film’s premise and noting the film’s 
unique position at the forefront of a social trend). 
 239. See discussion Part IV.B. 
 240. All four attempts have been made in California school districts: McKinley 
Elementary in Compton, Desert Trails Elementary in Adelanto, 24th Street Elementary in 
Los Angeles, and Weigand Avenue Elementary School in Watts.  See Natasha Lindstrom, 
For First Time, Parents Look to Pull ‘Trigger’ Without Fight, HECHINGER REPORT (Apr. 9, 
2013), http://hechingerreport.org/for-first-time-parents-look-to-pull-trigger-without-fight/ 
(describing the four attempts to reform schools through parent trigger laws). 
 241. See Kristina Rizga, The Battle Over Charter Schools, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 7, 
2011), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/03/parent-trigger-compton-NCLB?page=2 
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have led to various reformation actions being taken.
242
  With all three 
reforms taking place in the summer of 2013, it is too early to tell whether 
these reforms will have any impact on educational outcomes.  Noting that 
there is no evidence that parent-trigger legislation is an effective way of 
improving schools, Ravitch questions why legislators are passing laws that 
provide for a remedy that has no supporting evidence and has never been 
put into practice.
243
  Ravitch is not alone in her questioning and Big 
Philanthropy may be to blame.
244
 
2. The Connection Between Big Philanthropy and Parent Trigger 
Legislation 
The parent trigger movement showcases the negative impact Big 
Philanthropy has on public education when it imposes its education 
initiatives and policies on school districts.
245
  Parent Revolution, one of the 
advocacy groups at the forefront of the parent trigger movement in 
California, illustrates Big Philanthropy’s monetary commitment to this 
movement.  While Parent Revolution claims to be a grassroots 
                                                                                                     
(describing the aftermath in Compton, California of a failed attempt to ignite reform via a 
parent trigger law). 
 242. See Sean Cavanagh, School Born of California Parent-Trigger Law Opens Its Doors, 
EDUC. WEEK (July 29, 2013, 5:00 AM),  http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/ 
2013/07/school_born_of_california_parent-trigger_law_opens_its_doors.html (describing the 
opening of Desert Trails Elementary, which is the first school born of the parent trigger 
movement); see also Teresa Watanbe, Popular Principal’s Dismissal Leaves a South L.A. 
School Divided, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/24/local/la-
me-weigand-20130525 (describing the ousting of the school’s principal as a result of parent 
trigger laws); see also Allie Bidwell, Los Angeles ‘Parent Trigger’ School Sets Precedent with 
Public-Charter Hybrid, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Aug. 13, 2013), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/08/13/los-angeles-parent-trigger-school-sets-
precedent-with-public-charter-hybrid (describing the creation of a public-charter hybrid as a 
result of a successful parent trigger petition and negotiations with the school district). 
 243. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 205 (“It seems odd to legislate a remedy that not 
only has no evidence behind it but that has never actually been put into practice anywhere 
before the legislation was passed.”); see also PARENTS ACROSS AMERICA, PAA on the Parent 
Trigger (Sept. 17, 2012), http://parentsacrossamerica.org/paa-parent-trigger/ (noting that 
parent trigger legislation has “shown no overall success in improving schools nationwide”). 
 244. See Barkan, supra note 90 (criticizing Big Philanthropy’s promotion of parent 
trigger legislation). 
 245. See Cohn, supra note 228 (questioning why these new methods are more effective 
than the traditional procedures in place and the ability of the parents to understand and be 
aware of measures the schools are taking to fix a school); see generally Diane Ravitch, 
DIANE RAVITCH BLOG, http://dianeravitch.net (last visited Feb. 11, 2015). 
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organization,
246
 critics question how this advocacy group can remain 
independent when the majority of its budget comes from Big 
Philanthropy.
247
  Since 2009, Parent Revolution has received almost $15 
million from Big Philanthropy, including $6.3 million alone from The 
Walton Family Foundation.
248
  The executive director of Parent Revolution, 
Ben Austin, previously worked for Green Dot, which is a charter school 
organization that was launched with a $10.5 million grant from the Broad 
Foundation.
249
  Even Won’t Back Down, which heavily promoted the parent 
trigger movement, was funded by Big Philanthropy.
250
  While the 
connection between parent trigger and Big Philanthropy is clear,
251
 the 
motivation behind and the effects of this legislation are even more 
alarming. 
Parent Revolution’s mission is: “In states with Parent Trigger Laws, 
Parent Revolution supports parents by empowering them to transform their 
school.  We equip parents with knowledge, train them in organizing, and 
support the actions they take to improve their local public school.”
252
  
Although seemingly honorable, it has been suggested that this mission 
statement acts as a veil to the real goal of promoting charter schools.
253
  
                                                                                                     
 246. See Rita Solnet, Grassroots or Astroturf? Parents, Be Aware!, PARENTS ACROSS 
AMERICA (June 7, 2012), http://parentsacrossamerica.org/grassroots-or-astroturf-parents-be-
aware/ (noting how a Parent Revolution organizer testified claiming the organization had 
grassroots origins). 
 247. See Cohn, supra note 228 (“[Parent Revolution’s] heavy reliance on 
Walton money, critics say, raises questions about the independence of Parent Revolution and 
the intentions of the Walton Family Foundation.”).  
 248. Id. 
 249. See RAVITCH, supra note 90, at 198 (describing the connection between Parent 
Revolution and Big Philanthropy). 
 250. See FUND EDUCATION NOW, What is the “Parent Trigger?”, 
http://www.fundeducationnow.org/resource-room/parent-trigger/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) 
(highlighting that The Broad Foundation is funding the movie). 
 251. See CAL. TEACHERS ASS’N, Issues & Action: Parent Trigger, 
https://www.cta.org/Issues-and-Action/Education-Reform/Parent-Trigger.aspx  (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2015) (“There is also growing evidence that funding for many of the ‘parent trigger’ 
initiatives comes from wealthy philanthropists, policymakers, and think tanks that support 
charter school expansion and free market approaches to school reform.”). 
 252. See PARENT REVOLUTION, What We Do, http://parentrevolution.org/what-we-do/ 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (describing the purpose and goals of Parent Revolution). 
 253. See Diane Ravitch, The Trouble With the Parent Trigger, EDUC. WEEK (Oct. 4, 
2011, 9:29 AM)  [hereinafter Trouble], http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/Bridging-
Differences/2011/10/the_trouble_with_the_parent_tr.html (“Parent Revolution is what is 
known as an “Astroturf” group, an organization pretending to be representative of ordinary 
parents, but actually promoting a charter agenda.”); see also RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 205 
(“[Parents Across America] warned that the underlying goal of the trigger was to hand 
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When parent trigger legislation came up in the Florida legislature, a 
plethora of local education groups, such as the Florida PTA, 50
th
 No More, 
and Testing is Not Teaching, objected to the bill.
254
  These parent leaders 
“saw the parent trigger as an ‘underhanded ploy’ by well-funded groups to 
hand public schools over to private charter operators.”
255
  To combat the 
opposition, Parent Revolution flew in teachers from California to testify in 
favor of the legislation.
256
  Even an editorial in a Florida newspaper that 
supports charter schools noted that parent trigger legislation created an 
“uneven playing field” by giving an advantage to charter schools and those 
who support them over traditional public schools.
257
  Parents Across 
America, a grassroots organization aimed at improving the nations schools, 
openly criticizes the legislation and its connection to charter schools and 
Big Philanthropy.
258
  Not only taking issue with Big Philanthropy’s ties to 
parent trigger, Parents Across America is deeply concerned about the 
effects of this legislation.
259
  
3. The Effects of Parent Trigger Laws on Local Communities 
With the connection between Big Philanthropy and parent trigger 
established, it is important to turn to some of the deleterious effects caused 
by this legislation.  Much of the opposition to parent trigger laws focuses on 
the ability of these laws to carry out their intended goals.
260
  In the few 
school districts in which parent trigger laws have actually been utilized, 
                                                                                                     
public schools over to private charter operators and corporations.”). 
 254. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 201 (listing various Florida education 
organizations that opposed parent trigger legislation). 
 255. Id. at 201–202. 
 256. Id. at 202. 
 257. See Promote Charter Schools, but Don’t Stack the Deck, ORLANDO SENTINEL 
(Mar. 10, 2012), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-03-10/opinion/os-ed-charter-
schools-031012-20120309_1_charter-schools-traditional-public-schools-imani-elementary-
charter-academy (“Last year, lawmakers tightened traditional public schools’ accountability, 
but loosened the shackles on charter school growth. This year’s legislative session only 
reinforced fears [that] charters have staged a coup.”). 
 258. See PARENTS ACROSS AMERICA, supra note 243 (“California’s Parent Trigger law 
was promoted by the organization Parent Revolution, which was founded by charter school 
operators and backed financially by venture philanthropists.”). 
 259. See id. (listing problems with the parent trigger legislation such as the narrow 
range of remedial options available, the resulting disruption in communities, and effects on 
neighboring school districts). 
 260. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3. 
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controversies arose and communities were left in disarray.
261
  In one 
California town where advocacy groups attempted to utilize parent trigger 
legislation, parents and teachers recount the experience as dividing the 
community and disrupting their children’s education.
262
  Petition drives 
have been depicted as a process riddled with misinformation and deceptive 
tactics that pit parents against each other and the school.
263
  Animosity and 
tension in the community then starts to affect children in school.
264
  These 
unintended effects, however, should not come as a surprise.  In their book 
exploring foundations’ effects on society, Anheirer and Hammack 
comment, “While foundation accounts typically highlight the constructive 
processes of mobilizing coalitions in support of change, grants may also 
have the potential to demobilize or disrupt ongoing practices and 
relationships in the system targeted for change.”
265
  While philanthropists 
have aspirational goals, the fears of Peter Buffet are real: solutions created 
in a vacuum fail. 
Another concern is the amount of power given to parents.
266
  While 
increased parental involvement is nearly universally held as an effective 
means to further positive educational outcomes, parent trigger puts an 
immense amount of power in the hands of people who know little about 
running a school.
267
  Some equate this legislation as tantamount to patients 
                                                                                                     
 261. See CAL. TEACHERS ASS’N, supra note 251 (arguing that parents were manipulated 
into signing petitions and that a parent trigger laws are not an education silver bullet). 
 262. See Jeff Bryant, The Disempowerment of Public School Parents, EDUC. OPPORTUNITY 
NETWORK (Mar. 12, 2013, 1:12 AM), http://educationopportunitynetwork.org/the-
disempowerment-of-public-school-parents/ (“They talk of how their community has been divided 
and how their children’s learning has been disrupted for what is a completely unproven idea 
coming from rich people outside their town.”). 
 263. See Dean E. Vogel, Parent Trigger Laws Divide Communities: Opposing View, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/08/12/parent-
trigger-laws-california-teachers-association-editorials-debates/2646393/ (describing the 
petition drive process at McKinley Elementary School in Compton, California). 
 264. See Natasha Lindstrom, A Struggling School, a Bitter Fight Over ‘Parent Trigger’ 
Law and No Tidy Hollywood Ending (a la Won’t Back Down) in Sight, NBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 
2012, 12:09 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/10/02/14182480-a-struggling-
school-a-bitter-fight-over-parent-trigger-law-and-no-tidy-hollywood-ending-a-la-wont-back-
down-in-sight?lite (“‘It’s tearing that school apart,’ Adelanto School Board Member Jermaine 
Wright said.  ‘If the parents are fighting, then it starts to trickle down to the kids.’”). 
 265. ANHEIER & HAMMACK, supra note 96, at 62. 
 266. See Trouble, supra note 253 (“But giving the current parents the power to close 
the school or to hand it over to a private management company is akin to saying that 
whoever uses any public facility should have the same power, the power to transfer control 
to a private entity.”). 
 267. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 203 (quoting a mayor whose constituents had 
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seizing control of a hospital if cure rates were found to be low.
268
  Giving 
parents this level of power also disrupts the democratic accountability 
typically associated with public schools.
269
  Explaining how schools are 
supposed to function as a public trust, Ravitch writes, “The school belongs 
to the public, to the commonwealth. It belongs to everyone who ever 
attended it (and their parents) and to future generations. It is part of the 
public patrimony, not an asset that can be closed or privatized by its current 
constituents.”
270
  Parent trigger laws take schools out of democratic 
regulation and put it in the hands of a few parents, who will inevitably be 
controlled by those who control the money—Big Philanthropy.
271
  School 
policy, therefore, will revolve around political alliances rather than the best 
interests of the children.
272
 
In California, critics attack the law itself.  One writer describes 
California’s parent trigger law—The Parent Empowerment Act
273
— as 
“480 hastily approved words that give parents the option of turning low-
performing public schools . . . into charter schools of various stripes.”
274
  
The Los Angeles Times editorial board argues that while some local 
communities have made adjustments to what the board calls a “sloppily 
written and poorly implemented state law,” the state legislature must take 
action in order to make this law more effective.
275
  The editorial board 
argues that the law’s biggest problem is its glaring lack of transparency 
noting that the law does not require a public forum where all parents can be 
                                                                                                     
access to parent trigger legislation as saying “Mayors understand at a local level that most 
parents lack the tools they need to turn their schools around”). 
 268. Id. 
 269. See ANHEIER & HAMMACK, supra note 96, at 58 (discussing the common tensions 
between philanthropies and public education systems: their difference in approaches to 
standards of accountability and the democratic process); see also Barkan, supra note 90 
(reminding the reader that “voters—directly through their elected officials—decide on and 
pay for public institutions in a democracy” not just parents). 
 270. RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 203. 
 271. See Barkan, supra note 90 (arguing that in school systems where Big Philanthropy 
has invested resources, they control the school, “how classroom time is spent, how learning 
is measured, and how teachers and principals are evaluated”). 
 272. See ANHEIER & HAMMACK, supra note 96, at 58–66 (discussing the powerful role 
politics plays in the success of the foundations’ initiatives). 
 273. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 53300 (West 2010). 
 274. Rizga, supra note 241. 
 275. See L.A. Times Editorial Board, Fix the ‘Parent Trigger,’ L.A TIMES (Sept. 20, 
2013), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-parent-trigger-lausd-20130920,0,157 
841.story#axzz2peObQkRQ (arguing that local government adjustments to the law is not 
enough). 
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educated about the potential use of parent trigger laws.
276
  This lack of 
public awareness has led to secrecy, which has resulted in the 
aforementioned division in communities and distribution of 
misinformation.
277
  Describing the impact of the legislation on one city, a 
reporter writes, “Parents on both sides have accused each other of 
intimidation and harassment and called police on one another.  PTA 
meetings have erupted into shouting matches, and kids have been bullied 
for wearing pro- or anti-trigger law shirts to school.”
278
  Additionally, many 
parents asked to sign petitions do not understand the ramifications of the 
petition.
279
  One parent who unknowingly signed a petition to transform her 
daughter’s school to a charter school thought she was just acknowledging 
that she had safety concerns about the school.
280
  The lack of transparency 
and resulting division in communities and confusion among parents 
evidences the carelessness that was used in enacting such powerful 
legislation. 
Another fundamental flaw with California’s Parent Empowerment 
Law is that if the petition garners enough signatures, then parents who did 
not sign the petition activating the parent trigger law are denied the ability 
to vote on what remedial action should be taken.
281
  At Desert Trails 
Elementary School in California, a court battle ensued after parents who 
were confused about the petitions being circulated wanted to rescind their 
names.
282
  Ruling that parents were not allowed to rescind their names, 
                                                                                                     
 276. .See id. (“The lack of a public forum is fundamentally wrong. These are public 
schools, and the petitions have the force of law. The fate of taxpayer-funded schools should 
not be decided in secrecy.”). 
 277. See id. (noting that this secrecy has resulted in parents being fed misinformation 
from both parents promoting parent intervention and teachers fighting the changes). 
 278. Lindstrom, supra note 264.  
 279. See Rizga, supra note241, (“[M]any parents didn’t fully understand what they 
were signing, or realize that teachers and the principal would be fired when Celerity comes 
in . . . some parents . . . thought they were agreeing to “beautify” the school, or just signed 
the petition to get the canvassers to go away.”). 
 280. See David Bacon, Trigger Laws: Does Signing a Petition Give Parents a Voice?, 
26:1 RETHINKING SCHS. (Fall 2011), http://www.rethinkingschools.org/archive/26_ 
01/26_01_bacon.shtml (quoting a parent who had a woman with a petition come to her door 
saying, “There was a place on the form that asked about our concerns, so I signed and 
circled ‘safety.’  I’ve been worried that the school gates are sometimes left open, and 
children might wander out, or other people come in”). 
 281. See L.A Times Editorial Board, supra note 275 (describing this type of treatment 
as “tantamount to telling voters that if they didn’t cast ballots for the winner in the primary 
election, they’re not allowed to vote in the runoff”). 
 282. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 200 (detailing the effect of parent trigger 
legislation at the Desert Trails Elementary School). 
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fifty-three parents at a school of over six hundred students determined the 
fate of the school.
283
  The Los Angeles Times editorial board argues that 
these issues deny parents a truly informed choice when it comes to their 
child’s education and could be easily remedied by the California 
legislature.
284
  Without such changes, the board argues, the Parent 




While few schools have been impacted by parent trigger legislation so 
far, the few communities who have evidence the harmful side effects.  Like 
the small school initiative, this law is another example of how Big 
Philanthropy’s efforts to reform schools have backfired. Once this 
legislation is adopted by a state, Big Philanthropy can then utilize 
“grassroots” advocacy groups, some of which were founded by charter 
school organizations,
286
 to change underperforming public schools to 
charter schools funded by Big Philanthropy.
287
  In the process, communities 
are broken, battles in court ensue, democratic accountability is lost, and 
children in already failing schools suffer.
288
  Parent trigger legislation may 
be another failed experiment in the ever-revolving door of education reform 
silver bullets. 
V. A Prescription for Change 
Big Philanthropy’s involvement in advancing education reform 
movements has major implications for the national education landscape.  
As evidenced by the discussions on the charter school movement and parent 
                                                                                                     
 283. Id.  
 284. See L.A Times Editorial Board, supra note 275 (arguing that leaving these changes 
up to individual school districts is ineffective and that some rules—including the inability 
for parents who did not sign the petition to vote on the intervention—must be amended at the 
state level). 
 285. See id. (“The concept of the parent trigger is worthwhile: to give parents some say 
when a school provides a grossly inferior education and educators ignore their valid 
concerns.  Overall, though, the law has not risen to that lofty ideal.”). 
 286. See Solnet, supra note 246 (noting that Parent Revolution was founded by Steve 
Barr, who is the founder of Green Dot Public Schools, a charter school organization funded 
by Big Philanthropy). 
 287. See Cohn, supra note 228 (illustrating this connection by noting that The Walton 
Family Foundation is one of the largest private donors to charter schools and that “it is a 
strong proponent of the expansion of charter schools, school voucher programs and other 
efforts to privatize public education”). 
 288. See supra Part IV. A.4. 
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trigger legislation above, these reform movements are having negative 
impacts on surrounding communities, schools, and most importantly, 
students.
289
  Putting aside Big Philanthropy’s motive behind their financial 
contributions, it is clear that greater transparency and more effective 
regulation is needed to combat the harmful side effects of Big 
Philanthropy’s influence on education. 
An increase in regulation of charter schools may help shield against 
many of the destructive effects in education caused by the proliferation of 
these schools.  States should increase regulation of charter schools to ensure 
that they are collaborating with public schools, rather than working against 
them.
290
  Two-schools systems that have developed as a result of the 
differences between traditional public school and de-regulated charter 
schools have a significant deleterious impact on education.
291
  By holding 
charter schools to the same standards as public schools—especially when it 
comes to accepting students with disabilities and low-performing 
students—the needs of the lowest-performing students would be better 
met.
292
   
The authorization and funding of charter schools should also be 
subject to greater oversight.  State laws should seek to ensure that charter 
schools are created and operated by local educators and members of the 
community rather than charter chains or a Big Philanthropy experiment.
293
  
Describing the ideal charter scenario, Ravitch writes, “[Charter schools] 
should be stand-alone, community-based schools designed and managed by 
parents, teachers, and members of the local community for the children of 
that district.”
294
  Without the natural interest and insight into the community 
and the effects of educational reform on local schools, charter schools will 
continue to perpetuate these harmful effects that are currently being ignored 
because the direction is coming from outsiders instead of the community. 
                                                                                                     
 289. See supra Part IV. 
 290. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 247–50 (discussing the detrimental effects of a 
two-school system operating in the same community). 
 291. See supra Part IV.A. 
 292. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 251 (“If charter schools sought to enroll the 
neediest students, they would become . . . a valued partner of public schools.  Instead of 
fighting with each other over space and resources, the two sectors would have a common 
goal of educating all children well and a genuine basis for shared responsibility.”). 
 293. See id. at 250 (arguing that state laws should ensure charter schools are locally 
based operations). 
 294. Id. at 250. 
BIG PHILANTHROPY’S UNRESTRAINED INFLUENCE 641 
Parent trigger legislation would benefit from both a less punitive 
approach and greater transparency.
295
  Pitting parents against teachers and 
school administrators not only severely disrupts the school environment, 
affecting student learning, but also dismantles communities.
296
  Rather than 
having reform coming from organizations with agendas, the reform strategy 
should be devised on a local level aiming to tailor to the needs of the 
community.
297
  Instead of narrowly focusing on firing staff or closing the 
school, parent trigger legislation should include more positive choices for 
parents to make.
298
  Additionally, the legislation should mandate greater 
transparency.
299
  Parents Across America, an organization that is weary of 
parent trigger legislation and those who are promoting its expansion, 
suggests that the “law must require that any paid organizers publicly 
identify themselves and disclose their financial backers.  Paid organizers 
must be supporting parents’ interest, not acting on behalf of their own 
organizations or particular operators.”
300
  With greater transparency, parents 
would have a better understanding of the underlying issues, which would 
hopefully decrease the coercion and disrupted communities that have 
resulted from this legislation.
301
 
Perhaps states considering parent trigger legislation should follow the 
approach taken by Connecticut, which did not believe that the original 
model of parent trigger legislation provided meaningful parental 
involvement.
302
  Instead of allowing parents to take over the school if it 
failed to meet adequate yearly progress, Connecticut created a program in 
which a council, selected by both parents and teachers, oversaw the school 
for three years.
303
  During those years, the council would be responsible for 
                                                                                                     
 295. See L.A. Times Editorial Board, supra note 275 (noting that the lack of 
transparency and “a public forum is fundamentally wrong”). 
 296. See Bacon, supra note 280 (quoting a co-director of the Advancement Project as 
stating, “Additionally, [parent trigger legislation] runs a serious chance of abuse and racial 
polarization where intentions behind the petition may not be just about academics”). 
 297. See PARENTS ACROSS AMERICA, supra note 243 (noting the need for a more 
locally-formulated approach to school reform).  
 298. See RAVITCH, supra note 69, at 205 (suggesting reforms to reduce the negative 
consequence of parent trigger legislation). 
 299. See PARENTS ACROSS AMERICA, supra note 243 (discussing the need for 
transparency). 
 300. Id. 
 301. See supra Part IV. 
 302. See Bacon, supra note 280 (detailing the concerns of Connecticut educators and 
legislators that parent trigger legislation did not promote meaningful parental involvement). 
 303. See id. (describing Connecticut’s alternative adaptation of parent trigger 
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developing parent involvement policies, reviewing achievement data, 
advising on hiring and firing decisions, and monitoring many other 
matters.
304
  If after three years of collaboration—not after gathering enough 
signatures—the school was still failing, then school takeover would be an 
option parents could pursue.
305
  This adaptation of parent trigger legislation 
could provide much-needed positive collaboration between parents and 
educators. 
Change is, and has been, needed all across the education landscape.  
As test scores remain low, resegregation threatens schools, and educational 
outcomes remain stagnant, Big Philanthropy has spent the last decade 
trying to discover and implement the education silver bullet.  While their 
intentions can be debated, it is more important to look at the effects of their 
efforts.  By examining just two of Big Philanthropy’s educational 
initiatives—one that has been around for years and one new to the 
education scene—it is evident that problems are emerging and students are 
suffering.  States need to rein in the power of Big Philanthropy and put an 
end to the endless educational experiments being conducted on the nation’s 
students.  By offering more oversight and requiring increased transparency, 
communities can work in tandem with Big Philanthropy rather than in their 
shadow. 
                                                                                                     
legislation). 
 304. See id. (illustrating what types of oversight the council would be involved in). 
 305. Id. 
